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The extent of and changes in inter-generational mobility of wealth are central to understanding dynamics
of wealth inequality but hard to measure. Using estate tax returns data, we observe that the share of
women among the very wealthy (top 0.01%) in the United States peaked in the late 1960s, reaching
almost 50%. Three decades on, women's share had declined to one third, a return to pre-war levels.
We argue that this pattern mirrors the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth in the economy
and thus the gender-composition of the wealthiest may serve as a proxy for inter-generational wealth
mobility. This proxy for "dynastic wealth'' suggests that wealth mobility in the past century decreased
until the 1970s and rose thereafter, a pattern consistent with technological change driving long term
trends in income inequality and mobility. Greater wealth mobility in recent decades is also consistent
with the simultaneous rise in top income shares and relatively stable wealth concentration.
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The share of women among the very wealthy peaked in the late 1960s. According to estate
tax returns, in 1925 one quarter of the wealthiest 0.01 percent was women. This fraction rose
rapidly through World War II (WWII) and then more slowly to peak in 1969, when women
neared parity with men. Since then, the decline has been marked. By 2000, women’s share had
fallen to one-third, its pre-war level. While the rise was evident among all wealth groups in the
top 1 percent of the wealth distribution, the decline was conﬁned to the very top. Figure 1a
graphs the share of women for four diﬀerent groups in the top 1 percent among decedents by
year. Figure 1b does the same for the “living” population with the help of estate-multipliers
(a method that treats death as a random sampling device and uses mortality rates by age and
gender to infer the distribution of wealth among the living, as described in the Data Appendix).
This decline in the share of women in the top wealth groups took place against a backdrop
of unprecedented economic emancipation. Moreover, women’s progress in the labor market has
not been conﬁned to the lower rungs. Social Security data analyzed by Kopczuk et al. (2007)
reveal that since the 1970s there has been a steady increase of women among top earners: in
the highest category they analyze (top 0.1 percent), women’s share increased by a factor of
six. We argue that rather than reﬂecting women’s labor market status, the presence of women
among the very wealthy may mirror the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth.
Such a pattern could follow if men make wealth, but both men and women inherit it.1 If so,
changes to the gender wealth distribution may serve as a gauge of inter-generational wealth
mobility at the top, an entity on which there is little information.
Our gender proxy for wealth mobility among the wealthy suggests that inter-generational
wealth mobility decreased in the period 1925-1969 and increased thereafter. Higher wealth
mobility in recent decades coincides with a rise in income concentration (Piketty and Saez,
2003). It is also noteworthy in light of the recent ﬁnding that top shares of wealth have
increased very slowly or even remained constant (Kennickell, 2003; Scholz, 2003; Kopczuk
and Saez, 2004a), which has raised the question why income and wealth concentrations do
not move in lock-step. The contrast between income and wealth concentration patterns is
illustrated on ﬁgures 2a and 2b. Our ﬁndings suggest a potential reconciliation. While wealth
concentration has remained stable, the composition of the wealthy may have changed. Less
dynastic and more self-made wealth at the top is consistent with Piketty and Saez’s (2003)
1We provide some supportive evidence that this assumption applies to the wealthy in the United States
during the 20
th century in Section 3.3.
1ﬁnding that recent increases in income inequality were driven by labor rather than capital
income inequality, assuming that the self made derive a higher share of income from labor
than those who inherited wealth. Finally, a U-shaped pattern for wealth mobility is consistent
with a primary role for technological change in driving secular trends in inequality, further
discussed in Section 5.
Recently, Charles and Hurst (2003) studied intergenerational wealth mobility using a sam-
ple representative of the full population (using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID))
and brieﬂy surveyed the small literature on this topic. However, the PSID sample is too small
to study the top of the wealth distribution, where most wealth is held, and contains wealth
information for only a short period of time. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) lacks
the panel dimension and is similarly limited time wise but allows for the studying of the top
0.5% of the household wealth distribution. Beyond that, the study of wealth mobility has been
limited to genealogical studies of named decedents (see Davies and Shorrocks, 2000, who also
discuss the limitations of this approach).
Estate tax data oﬀer several advantages. Unlike the PSID or the SCF, wealth is attributed
to an individual rather than a household, and the data allow for the study of long term trends.
Estate tax data cover the very top of the distribution, allowing us to study groups as small
as the top 0.01% of individuals. Since wealth is highly concentrated, the top is quantitatively
important.2 Moreover, as seen in Figures 1a and 1b, it is also qualitatively diﬀerent.
Several pieces of evidence support our hypothesis. We construct a model of asset devolution
where only men generate wealth, but both men and women inherit and ﬁnd that explaining
the estate tax data broken down by gender and marital status requires a U-shaped pattern
in the importance of self-made wealth. Second, two sets of “rich lists” – the Forbes’ list of
the wealthiest 400 Americans compiled annually since 1982; and “A Classiﬁcation of American
Wealth” which chronicles wealthy Americans from 1675 and 1950 (at 25 year intervals) –
provide direct evidence on the relationship between the gender wealth distribution and the
role of inherited wealth at the top. In both sets of lists, the fraction of those who inherited
wealth and the fraction of women are highly correlated. Furthermore, from its start in 1982
to the present, the Forbes list suggests a sharply diminished role of inherited wealth; while
A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth shows an increasing role for inherited wealth beginning
2For instance, the estimated wealth held by those in the Forbes 400 (the top 1/50th of the top 0.01%) peaked
at over 3.5% in 2000 and the top 1% of households is estimated to hold as much as 34% of total wealth (Scholz,
2003; Kopczuk and Saez, 2004a).
2in 1875 through its end year 1950. Third, if the share of women among top wealth groups
reﬂects the importance of inherited wealth, we would expect (the inverse of) measures of
entrepreneurship to vary accordingly. Using Census data from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS), we ﬁnd that the fraction of the labor force who are employers (a
potential gauge of entrepreneurship) exhibited a U-shaped pattern over the last century.
A note on terminology is warranted. We favor a distinction based on how wealth was
primarily obtained: inherited (or bequeathed) or self-made. We will use the terms “rentiers”
and “entrepreneurs” to denote those who inherited and made their wealth respectively, unless
otherwise speciﬁed.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our primary data source
— tabulations derived from the administrative estate tax data base — and supplementary
data in the form of rich-lists. Section 3 presents a simple descriptive model that highlights
mechanisms that could drive changes in the gender and marital composition of the wealthy.
We use this model to evaluate the plausibility of our hypothesis and to infer the importance
of inherited vs. self-made fortunes. We then discuss the validity of our key assumption that
wealthy women at the top arrive at wealth through inheritance, and show direct evidence
of changes to the relative importance of inherited and self-made wealth from rich-lists. In
section 4, we consider a number of alternative hypotheses, chief among which is changes to the
tax code, changes which impact the tax-minimizing allocation of wealth between spouses. The
marriage market changed substantially as well. Speciﬁcally, we discuss the role of divorce laws
liberalization and changing norms for spousal allocation of property. Finally, we discuss the
role of changes to the distribution of estates between community and non-community property
states. Section 5 concludes with a fuller discussion of how our ﬁnding relates to the literature
on the role of technological change and income concentration.
2 Data
Our main data source is the set of tabulations based on micro estate tax data collected by the
Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The database of estate
tax returns contains all returns ﬁled since the introduction of the federal estate tax in 1916
through 1945, samples for 1962, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976 and all years after 1982. Our data cover
3the period 1925-2000.3 The data contain most of the information recorded on the tax returns,
including basic demographic characteristic such as age, gender, marital status and state of
residence. Although the database itself is conﬁdential, we obtained very detailed tabulations
by ﬁnely deﬁned wealth categories, marital property regime in place in the state of residence
(not available in 1962 and 1972), marital status (not available in 1965) and gender. We will
concentrate on groups within the wealthiest .4%.4
We will study both the distribution of decedents and the distribution of the living con-
structed from estate tax returns. For the latter, we will employ the estate multiplier method-
ology as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004a) and further discussed in the Appendix. The estate
multiplier methodology amounts to weighting the population by the inverse of the mortality
rate, essentially treating death as a random sampling device. As mentioned, Figure 1a show
the evolution over the past century of the fraction of women among decedents in the top 1
percent divided in four categories: the wealthiest 0.01% (P99.99-100), the wealthiest 0.10%,
those between the top 0.10% and the top 0.40% (P99.60-99.90), and ﬁnally those between the
top 0.40% and the top 1% (P99-99.6).5 Figure 1b shows the same series for “the living,” where
the data has been weighed by the estate multipliers.6
There are two (not mutually exclusive) ways of viewing the diﬀerence between patterns
emerging for decedents and the living. First, mechanically, estate-multiplier weighting puts
greater emphasis on younger individuals. Second, and relatedly, the estate multiplier technique
shows values more representative of the whole population not just because of mortality-adjusted
weighting, but also because estates of younger decedents are much less likely to be skewed by
any tax-motivated planning. For instance, Kopczuk (2007) found that a substantial share of
tax-motivated adjustments takes place following the onset of a terminal illness. Since younger
individuals are more likely to have died unexpectedly, these types of adjustments are less
important for the young. Lastly, the series for the living allows for diﬀerences in the age proﬁle
of wealth for men and women (and can thus account for diﬀerences in the length of time a
person was wealthy).
3A more detailed description of the 1916-1945 data can be found in McCubbin (1990), while the post-1945
studies are described in Johnson (1994). Between 1916-1924 we have no information about marital status.
4Due to the varying coverage of the estate tax, this is the largest group for which we can construct shares
for all years.
5Wealth thresholds in 2000 (2000 dollars) were 24,415,150, 5,503,678, 2,139,887 and 1,172,896 respectively.
6All ﬁgures based on estate tax returns use shares based on years t − 2 to t + 2 (when adjacent years are
available).
4Other data sources. Since 1982, the Forbes magazine has published an annual list of the
richest 400 Americans (the top 2% of our top group P99.99-100). Forbes attributes wealth
to the person mainly responsible for its generation and not its ownership, a method which is
likely to introduce a male bias compared to the estate tax data (e.g., only Bill Gates appears
on the list, not his spouse). Forbes does not rely on administrative data and it may be that
wealthy women are less visible than wealthy men, e.g., from being less activist owners.
For earlier periods, information is less comprehensive. We present data from A Classiﬁca-
tion of American Wealth, “an online book being presently written by Drew Caradine Shouter
(pseudonym) who has been studying the subject of wealth accumulation and society in Amer-
ica for many years.” The website contains lists of wealthy Americans, their biographies, family
trees etc. and is compiled based on various historical sources.7
We will also make limited use of the list of some 4,000 millionaires in 1892 published by
the New York Tribune.
Both the Forbes list and the Classiﬁcation contain information about the source of wealth,
and specify whether it was inherited. The New York Tribune list does not contain an explicit
indicator for inheritance, but it does contain a description of the source of wealth that we
rely on to assign the inheritance status, as described in the Data Appendix. None of the lists
speciﬁes explicitly the gender of the person. We assigned gender relying on ﬁrst names and
other available information using the algorithm described in the Data Appendix.
We also use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2004) extracts
from Censuses for 1920 through 2000. The Data Appendix discusses in more detail how we
processed various data sources.
3 Gender and inter-generational wealth mobility
In this section we ﬁrst formulate a simple descriptive model of asset devolution in which
only men generate wealth but both men and women inherit. We use the model to estimate
the shares of rentiers and self-made among the wealthy using the estate tax data. We ﬁnd
that the implied share of entrepreneurs in the economy follows a U-shaped pattern over the
study period, 1925-2000. We then consider those who never married. Simply put, if sons and
daughters inherit equally, we would expect the surplus of men over women in this group to
7A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth is available at http://www.raken.com/american wealth/index.asp.
Currently, it is a subscription based product. We are grateful to the author for permission to use some of this
information in this paper.
5reﬂect the importance of entrepreneurs. Indeed, the share of never married men over never
married women in the estate data also follows a U-shaped pattern. Next, we discuss patterns
emerging from the Forbes 400 list and A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth. The shares of
women and rentiers are highly correlated in these lists, and the lists corroborate the pattern
found in the estate tax returns. Finally, we show that patterns of entrepreneurship over the
course of the 20th century are also consistent with other evidence.
Alternative explanations such as changes to the tax code, changing social norms for intra-
family distribution of assets, divorce and remarriage, and compositional changes to the domi-
ciles of the wealthy (community vs. common law states) are discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Modelling the wealth distribution of ever-married decedents
For simplicity, our model describes population in a particular year i, ignoring cross-dependence
over time. As a convention, we will use Greek symbols for parameters that we will estimate
(α, γ and σ) and Latin letters (b and c) for those whose values we will assume. Subscript i
denotes calendar time.
Consider a world where only men generate wealth but both men and women inherit. We
will provide evidence supporting this assumption in Section 3.3. For simplicity, assume that
everybody marries once and is survived by one son and one daughter, and there is no divorce.
Clearly, the gender wealth distribution among decedents will depend on which spouse dies
ﬁrst, how much of the estate is passed on to the surviving spouse, how long he or she continues
to live, and what fraction of the initial wealth passes to the son and daughter respectively.
However, conditional on the value of these parameters at any particular time, wealth held by
women would decrease in times of new wealth accumulation and increase as this wealth is
passed down the generations, unless new wealth is created.
To further ﬁx ideas, we assume that there are two kinds of couples among the wealthy:
rentiers and entrepreneurs.
Rentier couples can derive their wealth from either the husband or the wife.8 We denote by
1 − αi the fraction of couples of this kind in year i. We assume that the person who inherited
wealth will be subject to the estate tax while the spouse falls below the threshold, regardless
8If both members of the couple were rentiers, this is equivalent to two couples with one rentier each. Our
model cannot distinguish between those two cases. If there are couples with two rentiers, αi needs to be
reinterpreted accordingly. Implicitly, we assume that the frequency of rentiers marrying each other has not
changed over time.
6of the order of death. That is, we assume that the rentier does not bequeath enough wealth to
the surviving spouse for us to observe both in our data. Our key assumption is that the rentier
sex ratio is constant and more female than the entrepreneur sex ratio. For simplicity, we will
assume that there are equally many men and women rentiers, i.e., on average, we observe .5
men and .5 women per rentier couple.9
There are αi entrepreneur couples. If the man dies ﬁrst, we observe him (as a married
male) with certainty, and his wife as a widow with frequency γi. In principle, γi can be any
positive number, but we focus on γi ∈ [0,1], which would be the case if husbands do not pass
all their wealth to their widows or widows de-cumulate or pursue tax-avoidance strategies.10
If the woman dies ﬁrst, we observe her with frequency c, which reﬂects (but is not equal
to) her share of property. We will often assume that c = 0, i.e., the wife of an entrepreneur
is not suﬃciently wealthy to appear in the top group. The polar case is that of c = 1, i.e.,
the wife is as wealthy as her husband. We will vary the value of c to represent the strength
of the community property rules across states. The widower may pursue tax avoidance and
de-cumulate. We allow for this possibility by assuming that we observe the husband in such
cases with frequency σi.
To complete the model, we posit that the probability of a wife dying ﬁrst is equal to bi and is
the same for the rentier and entrepreneur families. In sum, we observe various gender/marital
combinations with the frequencies speciﬁed in Table 1
Table 1: Moment conditions
Category with the frequency of
(entrepreneur) (rentier)
share of married women, year i = bi

αi · c + (1 − αi)/2

/Si
share of widowed men, year i = bi

αiσi + (1 − αi)/2

/Si
share of married men, year i = (1 − bi)

αi + (1 − αi)/2

/Si
share of widowed women, year i = (1 − bi)

αiγi + (1 − αi)/2

/Si
where Si is the sum of the numerators in all four conditions.
9Our qualitative conclusions would not be aﬀected by a diﬀerent but constant sex ratio (with non-zero
women).
10γi could be greater than one reﬂecting large inter-spousal bequests and/or wealth eﬀectively controlled by
the wife, augmented by additional wealth accumulation that could take place following the death of the husband
(which would introduce into the top groups some wives with “absent husbands”).
7Estimation. We observe shares of the marital/gender categories in the data for each year i.
Because the shares add to one in any given year, we have three independent moment conditions
speciﬁed in Table 1. The model includes ﬁve parameters: bi, c, αi, γi and σi, four of which
vary by time, as indicated by the subscript i. We assume the values for bi and c as discussed
below and, in our baseline speciﬁcation, estimate the remaining three parameters – σi, γi and
αi – for each year i. Since there is no cross-dependence across years, this procedure amounts
to solving a (quadratic) system of three equations in three unknowns for each year.
This procedure may be interpreted as a very simple calibration exercise. Equivalently, it
amounts to a just-identiﬁed method-of-moments approach where we match predictions of our
structural model with three unknown parameters to three independent moment estimates, i.e.,
the means of three (out of four) dummies for gender/marital status categories.
This approach is very demanding — it requires estimating three parameters for each year
— but it has the advantage of imposing little structure on the evolution of parameters over
time. As an alternative, we will consider a more parsimonious empirical model that imposes
more structure on the parameters. Rather than attempt to estimate separate values of α, γ
and σ for each year, we will assume that each of these parameters is a smooth function of time.
More speciﬁcally, in order to test for the U-shaped pattern of α, we assume that they are all
quadratic functions: α(t) = α0 + α1(t − 1925)/100 + α2((t − 1925)/100)2, and analogously for
σ and γ. Our estimation procedure amounts to estimating a system of nonlinear equations
using information for all years simultaneously and is described in the Data Appendix.
Discussion. A closer inspection of the formulae shows that we can readily derive the solution
for αi by combining the share of married women and the share of married men. These shares
are equal to the expressions shown in the table that depend only on αi and constants divided
by the sum of all categories. As a result, by dividing them through each other we obtain a
single equation in one unknown, αi:
married women year i









Intuitively, for the self-made, the extent to which we see married women depends on the extent
to which a wife shared the wealth generated by the husband. Once we know (assume) the
marital property sharing rule, c, and the probability of a husband dying ﬁrst, bi, the number
of ﬁrst-dying women relative to ﬁrst-dying men reﬂects the inﬂuence of αi only.
8Denoting the (known) term on the left hand side by ri, we can write the solution for αi as
αi =
1 − ri
1 + ri − 2c
. (1)
Thus, more married women (relative to married men) in a given year indicates more rentiers
(lower αi), for a constant c. Formally, equation 1 is decreasing in ri as long as c < 1 (which
we consider the relevant range). The intuition is simply that while married, the wife is more
likely to be wealthy in a rentier families than in a self-made family.
The model imposes some simple (though weak) testable predictions: since αi ∈ [0,1], we
must have that 1−ri
1+ri−2c ∈ [0,1]. This can be shown to be equivalent to min{c,1} < ri <
max{c,1}. Making the natural assumption that c < 1, it follows that c < ri < 1. For c ≥ 0,
the necessary condition for this condition to hold is that ri ∈ (0,1). Knowing the value of bi,
we can directly verify this condition from the data. In addition, if we know the value of c, we
can further tighten this restriction.
While the value of αi can be derived with no reference to the shares of widows and widowers,
the model imposes additional restrictions due to the presence of these groups. We know that γi
and σi must be non-negative. Given the solution for αi, the equations for widows and widowers
are linear in γi and σi, and so is the sum of all four terms. Consequently, the explicit solutions
for γi and σi can be easily derived as solutions of linear equations. Whether the values implied
by these solutions are positive is testable.
There are two confounding factors in the model. First, the frequency of observing married
men and married women depends on bi, the likelihood that a woman dies ﬁrst. We cannot
estimate bi from our model. Therefore, we estimate the actual likelihood using the IPUMS
census data for 1920 through 2000 combined with mortality rates from Social Security mortality
tables (further described in the Appendix). The estimated value of bi was 0.4 in 1920. It
was falling until the 1980 Census when it reached its minimum at slightly over 0.27 and it
subsequently increased to slightly over 0.30.11
11An additional assumption that we make is that bi is the same for rentier and entrepreneur couples. We
veriﬁed this assumption using pooled SCF data for 1989-2001. We deﬁned the “wealthy” as those in the top 1%
of wealth distribution in each year and as rentiers those who reported inheritance of at least $5 million in 2004
dollars (the value of inheritance was supposed to be reported at the time it was received, we applied a 5% real
rate of return to obtain present value). We then estimated b for rentiers and the rest (self-made) in the same
manner as for the Census data. The estimated value of b for rentiers was 0.314 and for self-made it was 0.322.
Varying the rate of return, the threshold for the wealthy group and for being a rentier made b vary between
0.29 and 0.38 with no clear pattern for which group dominates.
9Second, the extent to which the wife shares wealth in entrepreneur couples, c, clearly
inﬂuences the number of married women at any given level of αi.12 Since states diﬀer in
their treatment of property acquired during marriage, we estimate the model separately for
states with diﬀerent property regimes. There are three regimes to consider: community prop-
erty, common law, and equitable distribution. Eight states were community property states
throughout our study period, meaning that property acquired during marriage was considered
marital property.13 The remaining states were common law states where property formerly
was allocated according to title. However, with greater incidence of divorce, this system was
deemed unfair as it exposed many wives to ﬁnancial hardship on divorce. Therefore, a number
of states applied the principle of equitable distribution, i.e., divorce judges would allocate assets
according to fairness.14 Equitable distribution was already in place in 25 states in 1970 (Gray,
1998), and by 1994 the remaining eight states had adopted equitable distribution (Weisberg
and Appleton, 2002). We code states according to their status in 1970, following Gray (1998,
Table 1), where common law states are those that allocated property according to title.
Another concern is the possibility that c changed over time. It is conceivable that c has
increased over time (e.g., the aforementioned shift towards equitable distribution).. Never-
theless, from the discussion above it is clear higher value of c leads to a higher estimate of
α. Hence, allowing c to increase over the period when α is estimated to be increasing would
further strengthen this pattern. We will ﬁnd that α has been increasing over the past 30 years.
Thus, our assumption of a constant c is conservative with respect to this key ﬁnding. We will
return to this issue in Section 4.
Model results We estimated our model using data for decedents for all of the U.S. and
then separately for common law and non-common law states. For illustration, we present in
Figure 3 the underlying moments of data — shares of gender/marital status categories in the
top 0.01% — for all states. The results for αi are shown on Figure 4a for both all states and
common law states, under assumption that c = 0. To smooth the series, we use shares deﬁned
12However, the direction in which αi moves with changes in the ratio of married women to married men does
not depend on the chosen value of c, since equation 1 is decreasing in r as long as c < 1 (which we consider the
relevant range).
13Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Wisconsin changed
from equitable distribution to community property in 1986. When we split the sample with respect to the
marital property regime, we exclude Wisconsin.
14The length of the marriage and the non-market contributions of the ﬁnancially weaker spouse are among
the factors considered.
10based on years t−2 to t+2, when available. The results for αi,σi, and γi are in Figures A-1a
(all) and A-1b (common law). The ﬁgures show a marked decline in the share of entrepreneurs
until the 1970s and then an increase. This pattern is much more pronounced in common law
states.
The corresponding results based on the parametric approach that allows for α, γ and σ to
change as a quadratic function of time are presented in Table 3. Our hypothesis is that α2 > 0
and that the minimum (equal to 1925 − 100 α1
2α2) falls at some point in the 1960s or 1970s.
Furthermore, the model assumes that γ(t) > 0 and σ(t) > 0. When we attempt to estimate
the model on the full sample, we ﬁnd that α2 is indeed positive but insigniﬁcant, with the
minimum not falling in the expected region. However, there is no evidence either that γ(t) or
σ(t) are anything but constants. We can improve the power of the method by restricting those
two parameters to be constant over time. As the second speciﬁcation shows, the corresponding
results are very much in line with our story; the implied pattern is also shown in Figure 4a.
The minimum level of α is estimated to take place in 1973, with alpha bottoming out at 0.33,
down from the maximum of 0.74. All of the parameters fall within the economically sensible
region — γ and σ are positive and well below one, while the range of α is contained between
0 and 1. We then repeat the analogous experiment for the common law states. As argued
before, the model is likely to perform better for such states. This is indeed what we ﬁnd even
without imposing restrictions on γ and σ. The results are qualitatively similar to those based
on the full sample, with added signiﬁcance. The model does worse for the remaining states,
although once γ and σ are restricted to be constant, the quadratic pattern is again present
and signiﬁcant. In that case though the restriction that γ > 0 is now violated.
One reason to favor the results from common law states is that our model performs worse on
other dimensions in equitable distribution and community property states. In the unrestricted
speciﬁcation, common law states are the only ones for which the non-negativeness restrictions
imposed by the model on the values of γi and σi are not rejected. This may be because our
models perform better for low c, and arguably, c is the lowest in common law states. For c = 1
our model cannot distinguish between entrepreneur and rentier wealth (αi is not identiﬁed).
Also, for values of c close to 1, we would expect much greater sensitivity of results to sampling
variation and measurement error, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that the sample
size for community property and equitable distribution states is much smaller.15
15In the 1990s, approximately 50% of observations come from the common law states and a quarter from each
of the remaining two groups. In the ﬁrst part of the century, residents of community property states constituted
11Sensitivity of the results to the assumed value of c is investigated in Figure 4b. As discussed
in the previous section, higher values of c have a monotonic eﬀect on the value of α. Even for
c as low as 0.1, the implied value of α in common law states can be greater than one hence
rejecting the model. While the choice of c matters for the actual value of α, these ﬁgures
illustrate that its choice has no eﬀect on the qualitative conclusion regarding the time-pattern
of the share of entrepreneurial wealth.
Assuming that c = 0 is particularly problematic for the non-common law states. Hence, we
repeat our parametric approach using a higher value of c, c = 0.2, with the results presented in
the corresponding columns of Table 3. This change has no qualitative implications for any of
the groups of states, in each case preserving the quadratic pattern. Given the results shown on
Figure 4b, it is not surprising to see α falls out of the (0,1) range in the pooled speciﬁcation and
for the common law states. At the same time, all the model restrictions for the non-common
law states now hold. We conclude that, conditional on imposed parametric restrictions, there
is statistically signiﬁcant evidence of the presence of a U-shaped proﬁle of α for all groups of
states, dependent on the marital property regime speciﬁc choice of c. These ﬁndings are of
course in line with the patterns visible on Figure 4a.
The decline in the share of women in the top group was more pronounced among the
living than decedents. Therefore, we would like to estimate our model on the former group as
well. However, the model was formulated for the decedent population and cannot match the
data for the living (who are younger and consequently more married). A model for the living
would have to give greater weight to married individuals, how much higher we do not know.
However, considering only those who are married in the full population, clearly there must be
equal numbers of men and women. Thus, the extent to which we observe more married men
than married women among the wealthy would be driven by αi, the share of entrepreneurs
(for a constant c 6= 1). In terms of our model, equations for the number of married men and
married women remain valid with bi = 0.5, while equations for widowed men and women do
not because they should be multiplied by the unknown survival factors. As before, the solution
for αi can be derived based on equations for married men and women only. Assuming that
c = 0 and bi = 0.5, we have that αi = (1−ˆ ri)/(1+ˆ ri), where ˆ ri =
married women year i
married men year i . Figure 4c
shows the estimate of αi thus obtained from data for the living both for all and just for common
law states. An advantage of this approach is that the estimate of the share of entrepreneurs is
independent of the constructed value of bi. Again, αi follows a U-shaped pattern.
of the order of 10% or less of wealthy decedents and common law states made up over 60%.
123.2 Singles
The never married (henceforth, singles) can provide further evidence on the relative importance
of inherited vs. self-made wealth. If, as before, sons and daughters inherit equally, but only men
make wealth, then all single women inherited. Assume for now similar marriage ages for rentier
men and women, then the number of single men in excess of single women would be due to
self-made wealth. Figure 5a (5b) shows the fraction of decedent (living) single men and women
respectively for P99.90-100.16 Figure 6a (6b) shows the implied fraction of entrepreneurs. Note
that the implied fraction of entrepreneurs indeed follows a U-shaped pattern.17
The evidence from the singles is particularly interesting since arguably the gender com-
position in this group is relatively invariant to changes in the tax code, marital deduction in
particular.
While not deﬁnitive, these ﬁndings do line up with other evidence. A possible objection is
that rentier men may marry at substantially diﬀerent ages than rentier women. For instance if
men married later, we would see more single men. Also, a U-shaped pattern for the excess of
single men over single women could be driven by a similar movement in the marriage age gap,
although we are not aware of such a movement in the marriage mores of heirs and heiresses.
3.3 Rich-lists and IPUMS evidence
The Forbes list provides direct evidence of a strong (positive) link between inherited wealth
and the share of women; and their parallel decline. In 2004, Forbes estimated the wealth of
Margaret Whitman (eBay) at $1.6 billion, making her the richest self-made woman in the
United States. Despite the Margaret Whitman’s and Oprah Winfrey’s of the world, the Forbes
400 lists suggest that family remains the primary route to wealth for women. According
to the 2004 list, the wealthiest women in America inherited their wealth. Ms. Whitman’s
achievements only aﬀorded her the 152nd spot, well short of positions occupied by the widow
and the daughter of Sam Walton, the Mars fortune heiress, Cox daughters and others. In fact,
all seven women among the 25 richest Americans came to wealth through their families. In
contrast, of the 18 top men, 14 were self-made.
16Single individuals are overall a small fraction and therefore we need to deﬁne the top category more widely.
17There were more women then men in 1969 and 1976 and thus the estimate of the fraction of entrepreneurs
is negative for these years. While clearly this cannot be the case, treating death as a random sampling device,
this is what we would expect to estimate with probability .5 if there were no self-made wealth at all (and thus
equally many men and women among the wealthy). Another possibility is that there were more unmarried
heiresses than unmarried heirs, for instance due to the former marrying later than the latter.
13Table 4 lists, by year, the number (and share) of women on the list, and speciﬁcally those
who had inherited their wealth. It is noteworthy that while women make up 45-50% of those
who inherited wealth, their share among the self-made is substantially lower (6.6% in 2003).
Moreover, the drop in the share of women is mirrored by a drop in the share of individuals who
inherited wealth. In 1982, more than one third had inherited, whereas by 2003 this fraction
had more than halved.18
The importance of inheritance for women’s wealth is hardly new. The list of some 4,000
millionaires in 1892 published by the New York Tribune showed a much greater fraction of
women among those who had inherited than those who were self-made, Table 6. A similar
pattern emerges from A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth, Table 5. While the number of
observations is small for the early years and the fraction of women varies widely, the last three
data points are most relevant for us. In 1900-1950, the fraction of women among those who
had inherited wealth was fairly steady and around 60 percent (no women were self-made).
Moreover, for the period 1875-1950 these data show a steady increase in the role of inherited
wealth, consistent with our hypothesis that the rise in the share of women in the estate tax
data is linked to inherited wealth playing an increasingly important role.19
Further evidence for the importance of entrepreneurs can be obtained from the censuses.
Using the IPUMS data, we calculate the fraction of the labor force that is self-employed,
and, for some years, employers. These data show that entrepreneurship, so measured, indeed
declined between 1920-1970 and picked up thereafter, Figure 7.20
18The Sunday Times Rich Lists, an annual listing of the wealthiest individuals residing in the United Kingdom,
show a similar pattern for the United Kingdom. According to a recent article, the percent on the list who had
inherited wealth declined from 75% in 1989 (its start year) to 25% in 2006, (Times Online, 4/19/2007, http:
//www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1676370.ece), although the original 1989 article (The Sunday
Times, April 2
nd 1989) states that 57% of the wealthiest derive their wealth from inheritance. In both 1989 and
2007 the number of women on the list is below 10%. Our women-based proxy for the importance of inheritance
breaks down in a society with a strong male bias in inheritance.
19The greater fraction of inherited wealth in the more inclusive category (top 400) may be an artifact of
the data collection. Inherited wealth may be traceable and therefore relatively more visible in lower wealth
categories. Also, the criterion for the source of wealth being due to inheritance is “...whether a person has
signiﬁcantly contributed to the management and development of a business, in which case he will be allocated a
speciﬁc activity (e.g., banking, manufacturing, oil & gas, etc.),” (personal communication with Drew Caradine
Shouter on 1/29/2006). This is likely to lead to underestimation of the number of men among those who
inherited.
20The details of these calculations are in the Data Appendix.
143.4 Signiﬁcance
We have demonstrated several pieces of evidence supporting our hypothesis that wealth mo-
bility in the 20th century followed a U-shaped pattern. We consider (and largely dismiss)
alternative explanations for the empirical patterns in the next section, which may skipped
by readers convinced by the above analysis. Other than shedding light on the evolution of
wealth mobility, these ﬁndings are of signiﬁcance because they contribute to two important
economic questions. First, the increase in the importance of self-made wealth since the 1970s
is consistent with the notion that general-purpose technological revolutions (such as the in-
formation technology (IT) revolution) favor new over old capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001). Second, the implied process of obsolescence of old wealth
and creation of new wealth can oﬀer a reconciliation of the diverging patterns in wealth and
income concentration over the past 30 years. We elaborate on these issues in Section 5.
4 Alternative Explanations
We now turn to alternative explanations: changes to the estate tax code, changing norms,
divorce and remarriage, and changes to the geographic distribution of the population.
Tax changes The tax treatment of estates may aﬀect the gender wealth distribution by
inﬂuencing allocation of assets between spouses.21 There are two primary factors to consider:
the level and graduation of the estate tax; and the maximum marital deduction. The tax
treatment of marital transfers changed on several occasions, including the introduction of 50%
marital deduction in 1948, an extension of marital deduction in 1976 to the greater of 50%
and $250,000 and unlimited marital deduction in 1981.22 For our purposes, the 1981 change
21The estate tax was introduced in 1916 but rates remained low until the 1930s, when they were very sharply
increased (peaking at 77%) in a series of tax reforms between 1932 and 1942. Top rates were reduced in the tax
reform of 1981 from 70% in 1982 to 55% in 1984 and thereafter. For 2006, the top rate is 46%. An excellent
historical overview of estate taxation can be found in Luckey (1995).
22The marital deduction arose as a means of correcting a perceived inequity in the tax treatment of estates
between community and non-community property states. In the community property states, half of the com-
munity property would be automatically subject to the estate tax while in non-community property states an
exclusion would be granted only if the surviving spouse could be shown to have contributed to the acquisi-
tion of property. The introduction of marital deduction in 1948 was preceded by the 1942 legislation that
attempted to tax community property, unless a reason for exception as in non-community property states could
be established (Luckey, 1995). We investigate the relevance of the community property rules in what follows.
15is of most interest (we have no data to study the 1948 change, and the 1976 extension did not
aﬀect higher wealth categories).
The 1981 introduction of unlimited marital deductions made it more advantageous to trans-
fer assets to the surviving spouse at death (as opposed to an inter vivos transfer) – and as
shown in Figure 8, marital deductions increased sharply after 1976 (our last year of data avail-
able prior to 1981). A priori, we would expect a reduction in spousal inter vivos transfers and
transfers to others (inter vivos or at death), and an increase in the net worth (as observed at
death) of the married. The initial eﬀect would be to make the wealthy wealthier, more likely
to be married and more male. Subsequently, we would expect wealth held at death by widows
(widowers) to increase (since, presumably, they inherited more), partly oﬀsetting the initial
“gains” of married men (women).
This is roughly what we ﬁnd for the decedents, Figure 3. The share of married men in the
top group increases between 1976 and 1982 and the share of widowed women falls. There are
weaker but corresponding patterns for married women and widowed men. The initial decline
is followed by a recovery among widows and widowers and a decline of married decedents. The
evidence from the living is weaker, although some of the same patterns are visible. Consistent
with the logic that unlimited marital deduction reduces the incentives to reallocate wealth
towards the wife inter vivo, we see a gradual increase in married men. However, widows no
longer show a recovery post 1982, but a continued gradual decline, a development unlimited
marital deduction cannot account for, Figure 9.23
The estimate of αi in the model section decreases in ri, the ratio of married women to
married men. Thus, if unlimited marital deduction resulted in a decline in r (relatively more
married men), then the rise in αi seen in Figure 4a may reﬂect tax changes rather than greater
entrepreneurship. The eﬀect of marital deduction on the relative number of married men and
married women is diﬃcult to assess. By reducing the penalty for holding on to wealth, the
incentive to pursue tax avoidance after the 1981 reform likely weakened for both groups. As
a result, both the number of married men and the number of married women should have
increased. It is unclear whether such an eﬀect, if any, was stronger for men or women. It
is certainly possible that married men pursued more aggressive tax avoidance strategies prior
to the introduction of unlimited marital deduction and that therefore their reported wealth
increased by more than the wealth of married women.
Looking at lower wealth groups may shed some light on the issue. Less wealthy use the
23A possible explanation is that widowed women were more likely to remarry.
16marital deduction more extensively, see Figure 8, which would suggest that the 1981 changes
had a stronger eﬀect on their gender-marital composition. As ﬁgure 10 illustrates, the share
of married females in the remainder of the top .4% increased between 1976 and 1982,24 with
no similar eﬀect for the share of married men, thus suggesting a stronger response for married
women than married men. Given these patterns for the lower wealth categories, we suspect
that marital deductions cannot fully explain developments at the very top – the rise in married
men speciﬁcally.
Another factor potentially inﬂuencing the gender composition of estate taxpayers is its
graduation. We would expect greater graduation to increase the tendency to split taxable
estates when marital transfers were taxable (the case prior to 1948, and to some extent until
1982). One way of accomplishing this objective was by sharing wealth more equally while
alive. Moreover, absent marital deductions, a couple aiming to maximize wealth holdings of
the surviving spouse should tilt assets towards the spouse who is more likely to survive. Both
of these factors would result in more women among the wealthy as the graduation of tax rates
increased. Eﬀective marginal tax rates for the estate in the top .01% were in fact increasing
until the 1970s (driven by rates changes prior to 1945 and falling real value of thresholds
due to inﬂation after that (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004a, ﬁgure 10)) and stabilizing after that
until 2001. Therefore, changes in estate taxation could have contributed to an increase in the
share of women until the 1970s. Thus, the increase in the share of women in the early part is
consistent with increasing graduation of the estate tax leading to a more even distribution of
assets between spouses. However, graduation of the tax schedule cannot account for the later
decline.
For a number of reasons, however, it appears unlikely that marital deductions were the
sole driving force behind the fall in the share of women. First, while there was an increase
in married men in the top group, the lower wealth group saw no such increase. Arguably,
the lower wealth group was more aﬀected. Second, evidence from the Forbes 400 list reveals
a strong link between the importance of inherited wealth and the fraction of women, both
declining steadily in the last two decades. Lastly, we should bear in mind the results for
singles. Tax considerations have no direct implications for the frequency of observing single
males vs. single females. Thus, the fact that evidence from the single population on the share
of entrepreneurs shows a similar pattern to that obtained from married couples (and widows
24Note that P99.6-P99.99 contains 39 times as many individuals as top .01% so that the presence of individuals
moving between P99.6-P99.99 and Top .01% has a minor eﬀect on the gender composition of the larger group.
17and widowers) suggests that changes to the tax code have not been the main factor driving
the share of women among the wealthy.
Changing norms It may be that what is considered a fair division of assets between spouses
has changed over time. While this might explain the rise in the fraction of women seen in the
1925-1969 period, it is less clear that it can account for the decline since, although the no-
fault divorce revolution has been associated with negative economic consequences for women.
Assuming that women in the concerned group have more to lose from divorce, their bargaining
position would have worsened, which would show up as married women owning a lower share of
household wealth. However, the decline of women at the top of the wealth distribution seems
driven not by married women but by widows, thus casting doubt on this explanation.
While diﬃcult to pin down, the lower wealth categories provide some evidence on changes
to what is considered a fair share. The reason is twofold. First, wealth distribution is more
skewed than income distribution and therefore we would expect that at lower wealth categories
the bulk of wealth was not inherited. Thus, for a suﬃciently low wealth category, self-made
wealth will dominate. Second, at lower wealth levels, the wife’s entitlement is more likely to
be a ﬁxed share of household wealth than at higher wealth levels (where this share is likely to
decline with wealth). For instance, in the much publicized divorce of the Wendts in 1995, the
wife claimed 50% of the husband’s estimated 100 million dollar wealth but was only awarded 20
million on the ground that this would be suﬃcient to maintain the standard of living she had
grown accustomed to. In other words, the wife’s entitlement may only extend to consumption,
not savings, and savings increase faster than consumption with household wealth.25 Thus,
asset allocation in the lower wealth group may provide some evidence on what is considered
a wife’s entitlement. If so, changes in the share of women beyond what would be indicated
by the share of women in lower wealth groups might then be interpreted as caused by factors
other than changes in social norms.
Figure 11 shows the diﬀerence between the share of women in P99.6-99.99 and the top
0.01%. The diﬀerence follows a U-shaped pattern. In the beginning of the period there were
25The combination of the practice of awarding assets at divorce (and alimony) based on the notion that the
ﬁnancially weaker spouse (the wife) has a right to maintain the standard of living she has grown accustomed
to, and the non-interventionist doctrine of leaving it up to the husbands (spouses after 1981, see Kirshberg v.
Feenstra. 450 U.S. 455 (1981)) in ongoing marriages to determine what that (joint) standard of living is, see
McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953), suggests that a wife has an entitlement to a ﬁxed share of
consumption but not savings.
18more women in the lower wealth category, but the diﬀerence is falling rapidly and by the 1940s,
there were relatively more women in the top group. This reverses in the 1970s. Since then,
the fraction women has held steady in the lower wealth categories and the diﬀerence is driven
by fewer women at the top.
This U-shaped pattern suggests that the rise and decline of the fraction women in the top
group cannot be accounted for by changes in the norms governing allocation of assets between
spouses. The negative values for the 1940s through the 1970s is consistent with inherited
wealth being (relatively) more important in the top group (unless wives in the top group
received a higher share of wealth generated by husbands than wives in lower groups, which we
ﬁnd implausible).
It should also be noted that daughters’ being allocated a greater share of estates may have
contributed to the more rapid rise in the fraction of women in the top wealth group. While
equal division of estates became the norm among the less wealthy already in the late 19th
century, we know less about the very wealthy and it may be that they continued to favor
sons, albeit at a decreasing rate, well into the 20th century. One piece of evidence against this
is our Table 5 that shows that the rise in the fraction of women between 1900 and 1950 is
driven by an increasing presence of inherited wealth, not by more women among those who
inherit. Similarly, our Table 6 suggests that gender distribution of inherited wealth among
the wealthy, while not yet exactly balanced, was already approaching parity at the end of the
19th century.26 Furthermore, while wills of American presidents favored sons until Garﬁeld
(1831 - 1881), subsequent presidents’ wills expressed no such bias, starting with Arthur (1829
- 1886), (Betzig and Weber, 1995). Finally, we are not aware of any tendency since the 1960s
and onwards to increasingly favor sons.
Divorce and remarriage Easier divorce could lead to fewer women in the top wealth
category if the upshot were that wealthy men spread their wealth over more wives. There were
two waves of divorce law liberalization in the last century. The ﬁrst took place in the 1930s and
involved a few states and Mexico (a “loophole” in the divorce law recognizing divorces ﬁled for
there). The second wave, the so called “no-fault” revolution, took place in the 1970s, following
California’s removing fault grounds for divorce in 1969. Both waves of reforms are visible in our
data (not shown). However, had the decline of women among the very wealthy been driven by
26Fewer than 10% of women were listed as widows on this list, although as explained in the Appendix, this is
an imperfect classiﬁcation.
19serial monogamy on the part of men, we would have expected an increase in divorced women
in the lower categories, something we do not observe. The rise in divorc´ ees attributable to the
later wave is conﬁned to the top group. While it is possible that divorc´ ees do not show up as
such because of remarriage, we ﬁnd it unlikely that remarriage would eliminate all traces of
increased “polygyny.”
Geographic composition As mentioned, in eight (mostly western) community property
states, all wealth accumulated during marriage is owned jointly by husband and wife by de-
fault. Women are wealthier in community property states (for some years even wealthier than
men), and it is thus conceivable that changes to the demographic composition of the wealthy
aﬀects the gender wealth distribution. A growing share of the wealthy living in community
property states may have contributed to the nationwide increase in the share of women in the
early period, although the share of women in top wealth groups grew in both types of states.
However, geographic composition cannot account for the decline of women in the later period
since that would have required a decline in the fraction living in community property states,
the opposite of what happened (not shown).
In sum, several factors may have contributed to the development of the share of women
among the wealthy. The increase is consistent with a shift of the population towards community
property states, increasing graduation of the estate tax, and changing social norms emphasizing
economic equality between the sexes. However, these factors are unlikely to have played a role
in the subsequent decline. The migration to community property states observed in the later
period would predict a counterfactual increase in the fraction of women. The graduation of
the tax system did not change much in the later period, and while it is possible that women
lost out in terms of intra-household bargaining power in the later part of the century, the fact
that women have not lost ground in the lower wealth categories is inconsistent with such an
interpretation. Changes in the tax treatment of marital transfers may have played a role in the
decline, in particular, the unlimited marital deduction introduced in 1981. However, evidence
from the population of singles, a group arguably unaﬀected by such changes, suggests that this
cannot be the sole factor.
205 Summary and Discussion
If men make but women inherit great fortunes, then the share of women at the top of the
wealth distribution would reﬂect the relative importance of self-made over inherited wealth
and thus inter-generational wealth mobility. This is the interpretation we have given to the
gender pattern found in estate tax returns data covering the period 1925-2000, where the share
of women among the very wealthy rose sharply between 1925-1945 to peak in the 1960s, and
declined since; implying a U-shaped pattern for inter-generational wealth mobility over the
last century.
We have presented several pieces of evidence supporting the link between the share of
women among the wealthy and the role of inherited wealth. The marital-gender composition
of estates is consistent with a model of asset devolution where only men generate wealth but
both men and women inherit. Moreover, data from A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth show
that inherited wealth became increasingly prominent sometime in the late 19th century. While
this series ends in 1950, the Forbes 400 series indicate a decline in both the share of women
and the share of inherited wealth since its initial publication in 1982.
The share of women among the very wealthy may also related inversely to technological
change. In times of rapid technological change, self-made entrepreneurs displace old wealth.
If the self made tend to be men, the share of women declines. By contrast, when technological
change is more incremental, old fortunes prevail and as wealth at the top of the distribution
becomes more dynastic, the share of women increases.
We have presented some evidence of an inverse relationship between between the share of
women among the very wealthy and entrepreneurship from the IPUMS (the fraction of the
workforce who are employers). We conclude with a fuller discussion of how our interpretation
of the evolution of the share of women relates to the literature on technological change and
the distribution of income and wealth.
Equating women with inherited wealth, entrepreneurship would have followed a U-shaped
pattern over the past century. Such a pattern ﬁts the timing of the so called second and third
industrial revolutions. The period in which we see a rise in the share of women follows on the
heels of a period of major inventions (electriﬁcation and the internal combustion engine) but
is itself not one. According to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003, p. 419): “It seems to us that the
periods 1890-1930 and 1971-2001 saw more creative destruction than the period 1930-1970.”
Thus, the initial rise in the share of women in the 1925-1969 period may be attributed to the
21passing down of fortunes generated during the “Gilded Age” (circa 1865-1914).
The IT revolution, with a start date in the early 1970s, coincides with the decline of
women in our data. One reason why inventions (as opposed to innovations) are likely to
encourage entrepreneurship and generate new fortunes large enough to replace existing ones
at the top is that rapid technological change renders existing capital obsolete and favors new
ﬁrms (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001). New ﬁrms, in turn, tend
to be more closely held, owned primarily by the entrepreneurs themselves. Thus, technological
change may propel founders of ﬁrms that successfully adapt the new technology to the top of
the wealth distribution. If founders are primarily men, we would expect rapid technological
change to result in the top of the wealth distribution being both more male and less “dynastic,”
and the share of women to rise in its aftermath as wealth is passed down.
Our hypothesis is also largely consistent with the fact that the fraction of women in the top
wealth group moved in opposite direction of income inequality over the study period – if indeed
spurts of economic growth coincide with the generation of new fortunes and greater inequality.
While the increase in wage inequality since the 1970s has been linked to rapid technological
change, e.g., Juhn et al. (1993), Katz and Autor (1999), there has been less focus to date on
the potential role of its absence for understanding the decline in inequality in the 1930s and
1940s, and continued low levels through the 1950s and 1960s (Galor and Tsiddon (1997) being
an exception). Instead, macro-economic shocks such as the Great Depression, World War II;
egalitarian social norms and — their possible expressions — policy measures such as income
and estate taxation, anti-trust legislation and the GI bill have been given more weight, e.g.,
Goldin and Margo (1992), Piketty (2003), Piketty and Saez (2003), Kopczuk and Saez (2004a).
While norms are important, they may be viewed as endogenous outcomes.
Women as a proxy for old wealth complements the approach of Piketty and Saez (2003);
Piketty (2003) who have interpreted a high share of capital income to indicated the importance
of rentiers. Our approach has the advantage of not relying on the distinction between labor
and capital income, a distinction that may not be meaningful for business owners and may
be sensitive to changes in corporate structure and taxation. If the question is whether the
wealthy are thus because of their own industriousness, the gender wealth composition may
shed additional light.
Our hypothesis that the share of women reﬂects the role of inherited wealth among the
wealthy, and thus wealth mobility, is primarily a story about the top wealth brackets. For lower
wealth brackets, the decline was absent. There are several possible explanations for this. In
22lower wealth categories, the wife’s entitlement is more likely to be a share of household assets
than at higher wealth levels. Moreover, the wealth needed to enter, for instance, the top 1
percent (corresponding to the richest 2 million adults) was “only” about one million dollars in
2000 (2000 dollars), a net worth well within the reach of a small business owner or professional
at the end of her life. Thus, the share of women may have been boosted by women’s greater
incomes (directly and indirectly in the form of changes in the norms for asset allocation between
spouses). Finally, while the share of women in the top 0.1 percent of the wealth distribution
declined, women who dropped out of this category were probably still wealthy and likely to
show up in neighboring wealth categories. From 1976 to 2000, the wealth thresholds rose
more in the higher wealth categories. This was especially true for the top 0.01%, where the
wealth threshold rose by 13 million in 2000 dollars, while in wealth categories below the top
0.4 percent, the increase was less than one million. However, this eﬀect can only be modest
considering the small size of the top group. In sum, the share of women in the lower wealth
groups may have been sustained by a larger share of assets being jointly held (by spouses)
in lower wealth groups, women’s greater earnings, and, to some extent, a trickle-down from
higher wealth groups.
Finally, we propose a potential explanation for why wealth concentration remained constant
in the past 25 years despite the surge in income concentration. Figures 2a and 2b show that
wealth concentration declined in the 1970s. We speculate that this reﬂected the erosion of old
wealth and that wealth concentration would have fallen further still if not for the inﬂow of
new fortunes generated by the IT revolution in the 1980s and thereafter. There are primarily
two reasons for why old wealth would decline. First, assuming that the old wealth dates from
the Gilded Age, dilution from passing down the generations (because of its spread over more
people, estate taxation, consumption) would result in a reduction in wealth concentration.
Second, the decline in concentration in the 1970s is likely driven by the stock market which
has been connected to the arrival of new technology and the period of “creative destruction”
noted by Jovanovic and co-authors.
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26Data Appendix
A Estate tax data
Estate tax tabulations were performed on the conﬁdential data available through the Statistics
of Income division of the Internal Revenue Service. We deﬁne net worth as the diﬀerence
between gross estate and debts. Given the overall population and weights assigned to each
observations, we tabulated the number of individuals by gender, marital status and marital
property regime of the state of residence for the top 0.01%, P99.9-P99.99 and so on. Tabula-
tions for “decedents” use adult deaths as the population basis. Methodology for constructing
estimates for the “living population” is identical as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004b), we review
it brieﬂy here and refer the reader to the extensive appendix in that paper for more detailed
discussion.
The estate multiplier method relies on the assumption that decedents are randomly se-
lected from the living population. Then, given the probability of dying by mi, a single estate
observation stands for 1
mi observations. This is the weight that is attached to any given obser-
vation. Implementing the method requires appropriate mortality rates. Mortality tables were
obtained from the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) and rely on the life tables
constructed by the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration (see Bell et al.,
1992, for a full description of the methodology). While it is well known that mortality rates are
negatively correlated with socioeconomic status, the extent and trends in the mortality gra-
dient for the population considered here is not known. We follow Kopczuk and Saez (2004b)
and adjust mortality rates for socioeconomic status using estimates of white college-educated
mortality diﬀerentials obtained by Brown et al. (2002). The extensive appendix in Kopczuk
and Saez (2004b) discusses evidence on the evolution of mortality diﬀerentials over time.
We classify states into marital property regimes in 1970 following Gray (1998, Table 1).
When splitting the sample by marital property regime, we exclude Wisconsin because this
state changed its category in 1986.
B Census data
We rely on the IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004) data for 1920 through 2000 Censuses. For
self-employment and entrepreneurship calculations, we deﬁne our sample as those between
ages 18 and 65 who are in the labor force, excluding those living on farms. We rely on the
27variable classwkr (Class of Worker) to determine self-employment status (this category includes
values of self-employed, employer, working on own account, self employed not-incorporated and
self-employed incorporated, with diﬀerent subsets of these available for diﬀerent Censuses).
To classify individuals as employers, we use the “Employer” value for 1920-1940 and “Self-
employed, incorporated” for 1970-2000. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that these values
are strictly comparable and therefore the level diﬀerences between values up to 1940 and those
starting in 1970 for the employer variable should be treated with caution.
Estimation of b
We estimate the likelihood that the wife dies ﬁrst by assigning to every individual in the IPUMS
a mortality rate based on gender, age and year. In the baseline calculation, we weight each
married or widowed individual by the mortality risk. The total number of families with one
spouse dying in a given year is obtained by adding up these weights, while the total number of
such families in which woman was the-ﬁrst-to-die is obtained by adding up weights for married
females and widowed men. Our parameter bi is the ratio of the latter to the former. This
procedure yields values of bi for Census years and we use cubic spline to interpolate values in
intermediate years.
The intuition for this procedure is as follows. Consider a universe of married couples whose
members will be observed in the decedent population in the year they pass (a couple has two
members until one of them passes and then one member until that person passes). Assume
further that only one member of a couple dies in any given year (adjusting the mortality rate
for married spouses for the possibility of dying in the same year by assigning each of them a
probability of 1/2 of dying ﬁrst has a trivial eﬀect). Then, we can estimate bi, the probability
that a wife dies ﬁrst, by the number of couples in which the woman died ﬁrst divided by
the total number of couples experience a death in any given year. The numerator could be
estimated by adding the mortality rates for all married women and widowed men. To obtain
the denominator, we add to the numerator the added mortality rates for all married men and
widowed women.
We considered two variations of this procedure. First, we corrected mortality rates using
socio-economic mortality diﬀerentials as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004a). Second, we linked
records for spouses and corrected weights for the possibility of the two spouses dying in the
same year by subtracting for each of them a half of the product of mortality rates of both
spouses. Both of these adjustments had very minor eﬀect on bi and no discernible eﬀect on the
28estimates, the actual values we are using in the paper are based on the last approach. (We also
repeated the same results by education and the results are very similar. However, education
measures are available only starting with 1940.) The estimated values for the Census years
were 39.6 in 1920, 37.4 in 1930, 35.1 in 1940, 32.9 in 1950, 30.3 in 1960, 28.9 in 1970, 27.3 in
1980, 27.3 in 1990 and 30.4 in 2000.
C Gender and Inheritances
None of the lists of the rich (Forbes, New York Tribune, Classiﬁcation of American Wealth)
speciﬁes gender of the person. For the Classiﬁcation and Forbes, we identify gender relying
on ﬁrst names. We proceed as follows. The Social Security Administration published (http:
//www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/) list of 1000 most popular names for men and women (by
decade) starting in 1900, with their frequencies. Some of the names show up both as male
and female names, we use them if they are much more common (when aggregated over the
decades) for one of the genders (speciﬁcally, if the ratio exceeds eight). Both Forbes list and
the Classiﬁcation contain indicators for having inherited wealth.
The New York Tribune applies to people alive in 1892 and therefore 20th century lists of
names are an imperfect source of information. Furthermore, the list often includes only the ﬁrst
initial. On the other hand, the list often includes titles (e.g., mrs, miss, lady, mme, princess
etc.) that are more informative than ﬁrst names (e.g., the form of Mrs. John Smith is very
common). It also includes short descriptions of the source of wealth that in many cases allow
for identifying gender (e.g., a person may be referred to as a “daughter,” “widow,” “niece,”
or a phrase such as “left her,” “from her” and so on can be used). We use a simple pattern
matching algorithm to identify all such cases and classify them as women. We supplement it
with matching on ﬁrst names as described above, with classiﬁcation based on the titles and
description taking precedence (so that we do not mis-classify Mrs. John Smith). We assign
individuals an inheritance dummy based on the description, again using pattern matching to
identify phrases indicating inheritance.
D Restricted Model
The restricted version of the model described in section 3.1 is based on the set of conditions
in Table 1, augmented by the parametric restrictions imposed on the evolution of αi, γi and
σi: αi = α(i) = α0 + α1t(i) + α2t2(i), γi = γ(i) = γ0 + γ1t(i) + γ2t2(i), σi = σ(i) = σ0 +
29σ1t(i)+σ2t2(i), where for the ease of exposition t(i) = (i−1925)/100. Denoting the indicator
of marital status by I (I ∈ {m,w}) and gender by G (G ∈ {M,F}), the model takes the form
of a system of four nonlinear equations
P(I = m,G = F|i,bi) = bi

α(i) · c + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i)
P(I = w,G = M|i,bi) = bi

α(i)σ(i) + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i)
P(I = m,G = M|i,bi) = (1 − bi)

α(i) + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i)
P(I = w,G = F|i,bi) = (1 − bi)

α(i)γ(i) + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i)
where S(i) is deﬁned so that the probabilities add up to one. Because these four conditions
are linearly dependent by construction, one of them is redundant, without loss of generality
we ignore the last one. The independent variables in this model are bi, i and i2, and we are
attempting to estimate nine parameters: α0, α1, α2, γ0, γ1, γ2, σ0, σ1 and σ2.
Our data takes the form of annual tabulations by gender and marital status, this is of
course equivalent to having individual observations of gender and marital status. There are
6353 decedents in years covered by our data who belong to the top .01% and are either married
or widowed. We deﬁne three dummy variables DmF, DwM and DmM corresponding to the
marital/gender categories in the three equations. We replace the probabilities in the system
of equations by the corresponding dummy variables and specify the empirical speciﬁcation as
DmF = bi






α(i)σ(i) + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i) + εwM
DmM = (1 − bi)

α(i) + (1 − α(i))/2

/S(i) + εmM
We estimate the system jointly using nonlinear least squares. Because the error terms are likely
to be correlated, we account for it relying on the seemingly unrelated regression approach. This
procedure is straightforwardly implemented using “proc model” in SAS. We cannot exclude the
possibility of heteroskedasticity. For one thing, the number of observations varies over time
as population grows. Hence, our standard errors are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix. Speciﬁcally, we use the conservative “jackknife” approximation suggested
by Davidson and MacKinnon (p. 554 1993) due to its good small sample performance.
30Table 2: Number of observations in the estate tax microdata by year and group
Year Number of observations Population size
Top 0.01% .01 − .05 0.05 − 0.10 0.10 − 0.40 Top 0.01% .01 − .05 0.05 − 0.10 0.10 − 0.40
1925 104 409 512 3066 102 409 511 3064
1926 109 433 541 3239 108 432 540 3238
1927 105 417 521 3122 104 416 520 3120
1928 114 451 564 3378 113 450 563 3376
1929 116 457 571 3425 114 456 570 3422
1930 112 442 552 3309 110 441 551 3308
1931 112 444 555 3324 111 443 554 3322
1932 113 448 560 3218 112 447 559 3352
1933 112 443 554 3320 111 442 553 3318
1934 116 461 575 3446 115 459 574 3444
1935 118 465 582 3485 116 464 581 3484
1936 126 500 624 3740 125 498 623 3738
1937 124 492 615 3683 123 491 614 3682
1938 119 470 587 3519 117 469 586 3518
1939 121 480 599 3593 120 479 598 3590
1940 124 493 615 3689 123 492 614 3686
1941 122 485 605 3628 121 483 604 3626
1942 122 482 602 3611 120 481 601 3608
1943 128 509 635 3806 127 507 634 3804
1944 125 493 616 3695 123 492 615 3692
1945 125 494 617 3701 123 493 616 3698
1962 162 642 802 4808 160 641 801 4806
1965 170 674 843 5052 168 673 842 5050
1969 181 717 896 5029 179 716 895 5372
1972 186 740 925 5544 185 739 924 5542
1976 183 726 907 5438 181 725 906 5436
1982 186 736 914 5439 189 756 945 5670
1983 182 524 61 133 194 775 969 5814
1984 187 703 61 161 196 784 980 5880
1985 196 730 206 292 201 803 1004 6022
1986 204 796 676 3044 203 810 1013 6078
1987 206 814 506 511 205 818 1023 6138
1988 209 819 652 582 209 836 1045 6270
1989 209 819 912 2911 207 829 1036 6218
1990 209 786 826 759 207 829 1036 6218
1991 210 691 489 1661 210 838 1048 6286
1992 212 843 1048 2269 211 842 1053 6316
1993 221 712 463 1992 220 879 1099 6594
1994 222 712 477 2005 221 884 1105 6632
1995 225 882 1110 2649 225 899 1124 6742
1996 226 899 508 2069 225 901 1126 6758
1997 227 901 628 2156 225 901 1127 6762
1998 228 906 1133 3761 228 911 1139 6832
1999 234 931 807 1695 233 933 1166 6996
2000 235 932 829 1315 234 938 1172 7032















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 4: Forbes 400: 1982-2003
# with inheritance % with inheritance
Year #Women %Women Total Women Men Total Women Men
1982 72 0.18 143 64 78 0.36 0.89 0.24
1983 74 0.19 142 67 74 0.36 0.91 0.23
1984 67 0.17 135 60 74 0.34 0.90 0.22
1985 83 0.18 159 75 83 0.34 0.90 0.22
1986 88 0.19 150 76 73 0.32 0.86 0.19
1987 87 0.18 143 73 69 0.29 0.84 0.17
1988 66 0.14 107 52 55 0.23 0.79 0.14
1989 67 0.14 114 51 63 0.24 0.76 0.16
1990 70 0.16 109 51 58 0.24 0.73 0.15
1991 74 0.16 110 51 59 0.24 0.69 0.16
1992 70 0.16 107 49 58 0.24 0.70 0.15
1993 73 0.16 104 49 55 0.23 0.67 0.15
1994 76 0.17 105 50 55 0.23 0.66 0.15
1995 75 0.17 96 46 50 0.21 0.61 0.13
1996 76 0.17 99 47 52 0.22 0.62 0.14
1997 73 0.16 91 42 49 0.20 0.58 0.13
1998 69 0.15 87 40 47 0.19 0.58 0.12
1999 67 0.14 84 37 47 0.18 0.55 0.12
2000 49 0.12 58 24 34 0.14 0.49 0.10
2001 47 0.12 60 25 35 0.15 0.53 0.10
2002 49 0.12 58 26 32 0.14 0.53 0.09
2003 52 0.13 66 30 36 0.16 0.58 0.10
Source: The Forbes 400 Richest American, Forbes Magazine, various issues 1982-2003. See Data
Appendix for details.
33Table 5: Heirs and heiresses among the wealthy, 1800-1950
% Inheritance % Women Heiresses
Heirs+Heiresses
Year Obs. All 400 100 All 400 100 All 400 100
1800 151 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.11 0.40 0.33
1825 157 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.40 0.53
1850 275 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.27 0.45
1875 441 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.51 0.51 0.75
1900 422 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.60 0.60 0.50
1925 990 0.45 0.37 0.21 0.34 0.27 0.12 0.62 0.62 0.32
1950 735 0.61 0.49 0.28 0.43 0.37 0.22 0.64 0.64 0.52
Source: A Classiﬁcation of American Wealth, http://www.raken.com/american wealth/index.asp),
accessed January 27th, 2006. The ﬁrst column contains the number of individuals included in the
Classiﬁcation of American Wealth for a given year. Columns marked “400” and “100” correspond
to Top 400 and Top 100 individuals from the lists. The table shows the share of those with wealth
primarily derived from inheritance, the share of women on the list and the share of women among those
with inheritances, respectively. See Data Appendix for the description of data construction.
Table 6: 1892 Millionaires
Inheritance
Gender No Yes Total
Man 2366 417 2783
Woman 74 348 422
Total 2440 765 3205
Source: New York Tribune, June 1892. Note: The full list includes 4056 individuals, the table relies only
on those whose gender we were able to establish. See Data Appendix for explanation of our algorithm.
34Figure 1a: Fraction of females among decedents














































Source: Estate tax tabulations. See Data Appendix for details.
Figure 1b: Fraction of females in the living population

























































Source: Estate tax tabulations using estate-multiplier methodology. See Data Appendix for details.
35Figure 2a: Wealth and Income Concentration — Share of Top 0.01%
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Source: Piketty and Saez (2003) and Kopczuk and Saez (2004a).
Figure 2b: Wealth and Income Concentration — Share of Top 1%
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Source: Piketty and Saez (2003) and Kopczuk and Saez (2004a).
36Figure 3: Marital-gender categories in the top 0.01% of decedents



























Source: Estate tax tabulations. See Data Appendix for details.
Figure 4a: Share of entrepreneurs implied by married men and women among decedents





































































Source: Estimates based on the model described in Setion 3.1. Estimates labeled “quadratic”
correspond to speciﬁcations #2 and #5 in Table 3.
37Figure 4b: Share of entrepreneurs implied by married men and women among decedents in
common law states — sensitivity to the choice of c






































































Source: Estimates based on the model described in Setion 3.1 using decedents in common law states
and diﬀerent values of c.
Figure 4c: Share of entrepreneurs implied by married men and women among the living pop-
ulation in common law states


































































Source: Estimates based on the simpliﬁed model for the living population as described in Setion 3.1.
38Figure 5a: Single men and women in the top 0.1% of decedents














































Source: Estate tax tabulations. See Data Appendix for details.
Figure 5b: Single men and women in top 0.1% of the living population
























































Source: Estate tax tabulations using estate-multiplier methodology. See Data Appendix for details.
39Figure 6a: Share of entrepreneurs implied by single men and women among decedents
























































































Source: Estate tax tabulations. The share deﬁned as 1 −
single women
single men .
Figure 6b: Share of entrepreneurs implied by single men and women among the living popu-
lation































































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). See
Data Appendix for details
Figure 8: Share of marital deduction in net worth above the exemption, by wealth category




















































Source: Estate tax tabulations. See Data Appendix for details.
41Figure 9: Marital-gender categories in the top 0.01% among the living populations




































Source: Estate tax tabulations using estate multiplier methodology. See Data Appendix for details.
Figure 10: Marital-gender categories in the 0.01-0.4% category among decedents




















Source: Estate tax tabulations. See Data Appendix for details.
42Figure 11: Diﬀerence between share of women in P99.6-99.99 and top 0.01%






















































Source: Authors’ calculations based on estate tax tabulations for decedents and using estate
multiplier methodology. See Data Appendix for details.
43Figure A-1a: Model estimates, all states



































Source: Estimates of the unrestricted model described in Section 3.1 using data for all states.
Figure A-1b: Model estimates, common law states



































Source: Estimates of the unrestricted model described in Section 3.1 using data for common law
states.
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